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The idea of the freedom of conscience as an outcome of the long history of 
religious conflicts in Europe emerged in XVII–XVIII centuries as protection of 
minority (‘dissident’) religious beliefs, which for various reasons stood outside 
the mainstream Christian confessions and established churches. Since then, 
it is widely acknowledged that the freedom of conscience as the preserve of 
individual belief both framed by and independent of theological standards is 
the core of the human rights and civil liberty.
For many centuries, Christianity was quite intolerant towards deviations 
of the mainstream dogmas; the deviations were considered heretical and 
severely punished. When Christianity became official religion of the Roman 
Empire, “religious freedom was replaced by religious oppression as enemies 
of the Church and enemies of the State became more of less interchangeable. 
Moreover, since many ‘enemies of the State’ were also Christian, this resulted 
in wars which pitted believers against believers”. (Evans, 1997, p. 2) Similar 
developments arose in non-Christian societies outside Europe, albeit to 
a different degree: for example, in Muslim lands, the dominant religious 
forces imposed various limitations on minority religions, although in general, 
intolerance of other religions was not as extreme as in Europe. The common 
development in the medieval period of the European history was the unity of 
the state central authority and the dominant religion, which was aimed at the 
prevention of practicing of other religious beliefs. It was almost impossible to 
view conscience outside a theological framework: “The result was that while 
the minority approach towards religious belief might have differed from the 
majority, thereby raising an issue of conscience, a similar oppressive outcome 
resulted when, or if, the minority assumed power” (Hammer, 2018, p. 12).
The Reformation generally recognized the individual conscience, but only 
in the framework of the word of God. Nevertheless, the idea of the personal 
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understanding of Scriptures inevitably led to the freedom of thought outside Christian 
dogmatic. The next stage of the freedom of conscience was the recognition of the 
religious freedom in post-Westphalian Europe. The diversification of Christianity 
during the Reformation and the rise of the secular states resulted in the acceptance of 
personal liberty and individual freedom of belief including atheism and agnosticism. 
Two writers –  Pierre Bayle in France and John Locke in England –  developed ideas of 
the independent approaches to ethics based on conscience as the internal source of 
ethical knowledge, and religious toleration based on the recognition of the inherent 
limitations of the human’s ability to comprehend the nature of a deity.
Gradually, human beings acquired the privilege of a reasonable inquiry into 
nature, society and human subjectivity. It was a sense, in Charles Taylor’s words, 
that “freedom of conscience was a value that should be espoused, independent 
of confessional adherence, that there was something retrograde in its violation, 
something uncivilized”. (Taylor, 2007, p. 259) In political practice, it resulted 
in the separation of church and state, which was for the first time articulated in 
the US Constitution, thus legitimizing the very term “conscience” as opposed to 
“religion”. So, the right to freedom of conscience emerged through centuries as an 
independent right that need not centre on religious beliefs (Hammer, 2018, p. 26), 
thereby comprising the right to freedom of thought and religion.
In the XXth century, freedom of conscience was codified in the international 
human rights system as the forming part of the corpus of human rights, because 
it is assumed that without freedom of conscience there could be no real freedom 
of speech, opinion, expression, peaceful assembly, association or participation in 
social life. The creation of the League of Nations following the World War I generally 
indicated that religious tolerance was recognized as a fundamental concept to ensure 
peaceful coexistence among countries in the world. Although the League’s Covenant 
did not contain special article on the freedom of conscience, later the principle 
was fully implemented in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, which was 
proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 
as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations. The Article 
18 of the UDHR states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
Today, in most parts of the world freedom of conscience, thought and religion is 
taken for granted, and many people look at is as a natural human right. Nevertheless, 
we do not have to forget that this right has been acquired in quite recent times, and 
the way to it was dramatic (Bury, 1913). Even in nowadays, article 18 is violated 
constantly, and millions of people around the world continue to be oppressed 
because of their beliefs.
At the same time, the UDHR in general, and Article 18 in particular remains the 
subject of serious debates. It is generally agreed that the UDHR was adopted in 
the aftermath of the World War II as an attempt to ensure that such a catastrophe 
would never take place again. Nevertheless, eventually the universality of the 
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Declaration has been questioned due to the undermining of contextualization, or 
acknowledging cultural differences that exist between societies in different parts of 
the world. Religious beliefs and moral standards are shaped by the particular social-
cultural context, and the very concept of the freedom of conscience and freedom of 
religion emerged in Western European Christian context; it means that its content 
and significance could not be the same everywhere and for everyone.
Contemporary ‘post-secular’ societies are characterized by religious diversity 
and deprivatization of religion. They embrace freedom of conscience and allow each 
individual to decide for himself/herself how to pursue the ultimate meaning of life. 
They are marked by the fact that religious beliefs –  both historical and new ones –  as 
well as atheism, agnosticism and non-religious lifestyles, are equally viable options. 
Nevertheless, post-secularism (whatever it means) challenges two main principles 
of secularism –  equal respect to all beliefs, and freedom of conscience –  and its two 
operative modes –  separation of religious institutions and state, and state neutrality 
towards religions. Consequently, the popular expression, which is prescribed 
to Voltaire: the willingness to defend to the death the one’s right to say what is 
disapproved –  remains a disputable subject.
The current issue of Changing Societies & Personalities discusses some 
aspects of the freedom of consciences and freedom of religion in past and present.
Ivan Strenski’s On an Antinomy in the Discourses of Freedom of Religion and 
Freedom of Conscience introduces the new section of the journal –  ESSAY –  and 
opens discussion on the questions: Can freedom of religion and religious freedom 
really be separated in reality? Does not the one actually require or entail the other? 
In reflecting on the distinctiveness of the terms “freedom of conscience”, “freedom 
of religion”, and “religious freedom”, as well as their interconnection, Strenski goes 
back into the genealogies of the notions and argues that freedom of conscience and 
freedom of religion not necessarily imply each other. He uses some decisions of the 
US Supreme Court, as well as historical examples, as illustrations of the controversy 
of individual and institutional religious freedom.
Tatyana Nikolskaya in the paper Human Rights Advocacy of Baptist Initiators 
stresses that knowing the history of Protestants in the USSR is especially important 
due to resent cases of violations of the religious freedom and non-traditional 
denominations’ rights in Russia, as well as the necessity not to forget about 
tragic pages of persecution and discrimination in the past. The paper elucidates 
the unknown pages of Evangelical Christians and Baptists’ struggle for the right 
of believers, which according to the author formed the only mass human rights 
movement in the USSR. Although Evangelical Christians and Baptists traditionally 
were not interested in political and civil activity, in 1960th many of them started to 
participate in the struggle for the independence from the state and the right to freely 
profess their faith being influenced by the assurance in weakening of totalitarian 
power in the Khrushchev’s “thaw”. This did not came true, and hundreds of people 
were convicted of religious activities and sentenced to prison. Nikolskaya devotes 
special section of her paper to the participation of women-believers in human 
rights activities, and underlines: “It remains a mystery how these women, mostly 
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burdened by families, managed to travel so actively around the country, to study 
a lot of complicated cases, to write and send letters of intercession…” Finally, she 
stresses the mixed consequences of the human rights activities of Baptist Initiators, 
and mentions criticism of the Initiators’ protection of the rights of believers from 
within their own Baptist community because of a fear to complicate their situation, 
and of persistent unwillingness to engage in politics.
Mark S. Cladis’s paper Solidarity, Religion, and the Environment: Challenges 
and Promises in the 21st Century argues that religion and solidarity should not be 
treated as anomalies in modernity because solidarity plays an important role in 
establishing freedom of conscience and individual rights. In addition, religion and 
solidarity could be seen as cultural resources in dealing with the environmental 
problems. He stresses that “both religion and solidarity can act as double-edged 
swords” in a sense that they could contribute to peace and justice, as well as reinforce 
oppressive social practices. In exploring religion and solidarity, Cladis refers to 
E. Durkheim who had discovered religion as social ideas, beliefs and practices that 
shapes a society’s moral universe, and solidarité as an enduring source of human 
social identity and fellowship. Mentioning the today’s suspicion about the concept of 
solidarity due to doubt in common ground among diverse human communities and 
individuals, Cladis insists that solidarity remains a powerful notion, which celebrate 
diversity as a precious public resource.
Gnana Patrick in the paper Religion and the Subaltern Self: An Exploration from 
the Indian Context introduces the concept of the Subaltern Studies Project (SSP) 
and the interface between religion and the subaltern self in the Indian context. The 
term “subaltern” was taken from Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci who meant by it the 
subjected underclass under the dominant power influence. The term underlines the 
recognition of the historically subordinate position of various groups because of 
race, class, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, etc., and seeks to provide 
them a voice and agency. The author clarifies the relationship between the subaltern 
studies and the post-colonial studies in their approach towards religion and stresses 
the difference between them. The basic argument of the paper is that religion, 
considered on its own, could be an emancipatory experience for the subaltern self, 
due to its effective interpretive potential for the subaltern self to take on the caste 
system, which remains deeply entrenched into the Indian collective consciousness. 
Examples from the pre-modern and modern periods of the history of India are 
observed in order to support the argument.
In the BOOK REVIEW section, Anatoliy Denysenko reviews the Roman 
Soloviy’s volume Fenomen poiavliaiushcheisia tserkvi v kontekste teologicheskikh 
i ekklesiologicheskikh transformatsii v sovremennom zapadnom protestantizme [The 
phenomenon of the emerging church in the context of the theological transformations 
of the ecclesiastical transformations in contemporary Western Protestantism, 2017]. 
He considers the book as one of the most important not only in the Ukrainian  (post-) 
Protestant theological environment, but also in the ecclesiastical sphere of the 
evangelical communities of the post-Soviet space. In reflecting on the nature 
of (post-) Protestantism and the phenomenon of the “Emerging Church”, Denysenko 
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following Soloviy in the search of a new Christian theology, which could find new 
ways of expressing the Gospel in the contemporary culture.
The discussions on the freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and 
religion freedom in the past and present will be continued in the subsequent issues 
of our journal.
We welcome suggestions for thematic issues, debate sections and other 
formats from readers and prospective authors and invite you to send us your 
reflections and ideas!
For more information, please visit the journal web site: https://changing-sp.com/
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